




Identity Systems

Jim Fenton



“Defining identity is
like nailing Jell-O®
to the wall.”

– Source Uncertain



Flickr photo by stevendepolo

Terminology

- Subject

The person (usually) whose identity is involved
Sometimes called the **User**


- Relying Party

The entity the Subject is interacting with
Sometimes called the **Service Provider**


- Attribute

A piece of information about the Subject
Sometimes called a **Claim**

A Basic Identity System



Government




Commerce




Social Media

A Basic Identity System




A Basic Identity System



Elements of Identity Management

Authentication
Establish who the Subject is

Credential Management
Prove to Relying Parties
who the Subject is



Attribute Management
Provide information about
the Subject

User Trust

- User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental

 - Not all users trust any one entity

 - Most likely to trust entities they do business with and strong, trusted brands

 - Different trusted entities in different cultures

- An ecosystem of identity providers is required

 - Users need to choose their own identity provider

 - Need to consider ability to migrate to a different provider if required

Authentication



Flickr photo by shannonpatrick17

Authentication Methods

- Methods useful for user authentication are situation-specific
 - Type of endpoint being used
 - Required authentication strength (transaction value, etc.)
- **Problem:** Many existing identity systems are bound tightly to specific authentication methods

Authentication Strength

- Authentication strength should depend on transaction value
 - iTunes purchase (99 cents) vs. vehicle purchase
- NIST Special Pub 800-63 defines 4 levels:
 - Level 1: Minimal challenge/response
 - Level 2: Single-factor identity proofing
 - Level 3: Multi-factor identity proofing
 - Level 4: Hardened multi-factor
- Relying party specifies the required strength to the identity management system

Authentication Endpoint Diversity

- The Web is pervasive, but not *everything* is a browser
- Examples
 - Vending Machines
 - Set-top boxes
 - Doors (physical security)
- Modular approaches to authentication needed to consider a wide range of use cases

Security Opportunities

- Users that authenticate frequently at a given service are more likely to detect anomalies

 - More likely to be suspicious about, for example, lack of a certificate

 - Browsers can be configured to specially flag “chosen” identity providers

- Identity providers can detect anomalous user behavior

 - Similar to detection of fraudulent credit card transactions

 - Business/policy framework should encourage this

Credential Management



Credential Management: Functions

- Act as a “key cabinet” for the user
 - Each relying party has its own credentials
- Support Directed Identity
 - Prevent undesired release of correlation handles
 - Identifiers to Relying Parties are opaque by default
- Enforce secure use of credentials
 - Require use of secure channel (e.g., SSL)

Directed Identity

- It should not necessarily be possible for different Relying Parties to correlate identifiers
 - Insurance company vs. supermarket account
 - Pseudonymous identifiers for tip hotlines
- Users may still choose to link relying parties' identifiers
- Attributes may also provide correlation handles
- Credential manager can be subpoenaed if appropriate

Security and Availability Issues

- Security

- The credential store is a very high-value target
 - Credentials can be distributed to diffuse attack
 - High-level physical security is also required

- Availability

- Failure of an Identity Manager may have severe impact on its Subjects
 - Solvable problem, but needs to be addressed

Attribute Management



Distributed Attributes

- Self-asserted attributes have limited utility
- **Authoritative** sources for different attributes come from different places
 - FICO scores from a credit bureau
 - Driving record from state Motor Vehicle Department
 - Proof of employment from employer
- Identity system has a role in locating trustable sources of attributes
- Attributes delivered as signed assertions

Attribute Distribution: Example



Healthcare Provider



← Authorization Request



← Birthdate Request




Wine Merchant



Motor Vehicle Department

Attribute Distribution: Example



Healthcare Provider



Release Authorization



Trust Negotiation



Wine Merchant



Motor Vehicle Department

Attribute Distribution: Example



Healthcare Provider



Birthdate Request



Wine Merchant



Motor Vehicle Department

Attribute Distribution: Example



Healthcare
Provider



4 July 1976
-DMV



Wine Merchant



Motor Vehicle
Department

Attribute Trust

- **Federation: Prearranged trust relationships**
 - Personnel Security Clearances among Federal agencies
 - Business partners
- **Accreditation: Indirect federation**
 - Financial institutions, schools
 - Scales much better than direct federation

Identity Provider Trust

- Identity Provider has a fiduciary responsibility
- To the Subject:
 - Must use credentials only for the proper Subject
- To Relying Parties:
 - Must associate attribute requests and responses reliably
- Identity Provider may coincidentally function as an Attribute Provider
 - Functions should be considered separate to maintain privacy

Summary



Observations

- Scaling is critical

 - Technical (protocol) aspects of scaling are a solved problem

 - Scaling of trust relationships is the real limitation

- Chosen technologies need to consider a very wide range of use cases

- An ecosystem of identity and attribute providers is needed

 - Need business models for these functions

 - Public policy should encourage constructive behavior and help these entities manage liability exposure

Questions





CISCO